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ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to our understanding of compliance with mandatory accounting standards. 
Specifically, we examine the efficacy of agency related mechanisms on the degree of disclosure 
compliance with the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) accounting standards. Using data 
drawn from a sample of 170 Malaysian companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) in 
2004, we show that although overall disclosure compliance is high (85.2% of the items of information 
being disclosed), companies do not fully comply with MASB 10 (Accounting for leases), MASB 11 
(Consolidated financial statements and investments in subsidiaries), MASB 12 (Investments in Associates), 
MASB 15 (Property, plant and equipment), MASB 20 (Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent 
assets), MASB 24 (financial instruments), MASB 27 (Borrowing costs) and MASB 29 (Employee benefits). 
We employ an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model to establish whether selected company-
specific and corporate governance characteristics (proxying for agency-related mechanisms) are related to 
the degree of disclosure compliance. Our results indicate that only leverage is positively associated with 
the degree of compliance. The other variables consisting of board independence, audit committee 
independence, the existence of qualified accountant in the audit committee, CEO duality, the extent of 
outside blockholders’ ownership, firm size and profitability do not show any significant relationship with 
degree of compliance. These results have important implications for policy because they suggest that 
whilst agency-related mechanisms may motivate compliance with mandatory standards, full compliance 
may be unattainable without regulations. 
 
Keywords: Compliance, MASB, accounting standards, Disclosure level, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur Stock 
exchange. 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The foundation of good corporate governance is transparent disclosure. If corporate sector entities do not 
follow the policy of complete and objective disclosure while preparing their financial statements, the 
users of this information do not receive early warning signals about deteriorating financial conditions and 
are therefore unable to make timely adjustments. Suddenly an event may unveil previously undetected 
risk exposure of the corporate sector and trigger panic among the investor community. 
 
The recent Asian financial crisis was partly contributed by deficiencies in corporate disclosure or lack of 
corporate transparency. Mitton (2002) shows that during the 1997-1998 crisis period, Asian firms that had 
indicators of higher disclosure quality enjoy higher returns. Mitton (2002) used a crude measure of 
disclosure quality whereby firm that had a listed American depository receipt (ADR) is associated with 
higher disclosure quality. This, he argues, is either due to mandated disclosure requirements of the listing 
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exchange or larger pool of investors spurring increased demand for disclosure and increased scrutiny of 
the firm’s reports.  
 
In order to highlight the role of disclosure deficiencies in the East Asian financial crisis, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) commissioned a study in the second half of 1998, led 
by Rahman. The team reviewed the published financial statements, for the year 1997, of 73 large 
corporations and banks in five countries—Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. The actual 
accounting and disclosure practices of the sample companies were used to obtain a picture of compliance 
with International Accounting Standards (IAS).  
 
Specifically for Malaysia, Rahman (1998) found that compliance with the required accounting and 
reporting practices are mixed which suggest the absence of appropriate enforcement efforts. For 
example, most of the sample companies disclosed the amounts of inter-company receivables and 
payables, but there was negligible disclosure on lending and borrowing activities with the associates. 
Most of the sample companies did not disclose the amounts of foreign debt either in local currency or in 
the currency of repayment. All the sample companies mentioned the use of the closing rate for 
translation of foreign currency transactions. However, the recognition and disclosure of the amount of 
foreign currency translation gains and losses by almost all the sample companies was not in compliance 
with International Accounting Standards. None of the sample companies disclosed their accounting policy 
on foreign currency risk management.   
 
In a follow up study commissioned by Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants (CAPA), Lambert 
and Lambert (2003) examined the extent to which the accounting weaknesses identified by Rahman 
(1998) have been addressed to improve their disclosure quality thus providing a means to mitigate future 
financial crises. In addition to the accounting issues examined in Rahman (1998), Lambert and Lambert 
(2003) also include four additional disclosures contained in IASs issued since the end of 1997 and in force 
as at December 2001 namely IAS 35 “Discontinuing Operations” and IAS 36 “Impairment of Assets” which 
improve the transparency of financial statements for companies potentially subject to financial distress, 
IAS 38 “Intangible Assets” which is likely to highlight deficiencies in capacity to support debt especially for 
a firm in financial distress and IAS 39 which extends the disclosure requirements for financial assets and 
liabilities carried at fair values, supplementing disclosures already contained in IAS 32 “Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation”.  
 
The results generally indicate there are marked improvements in disclosure levels, observance and 
compliance with IASs and greater transparency. For Malaysia, there is a relatively low level of compliance 
with foreign currency disclosures and derivative financial instruments. This is largely due to the Malaysian 
standards are silent on recognition, measurement or disclosure requirements on these areas, unlike the 
IASs.  
  
The objectives of this study are i) to determine the extent of compliance with MASB standards in the 
annual reports, and ii) to determine the influence of corporate governance variables, ownership variables 
and other firm specific characteristics on the extent of compliance with MASB standards. 
 
The motivation for the study is twofold. First, it extends previous studies by examining the factors 
(company-specific characteristics) that influence the degree of corporate compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements in Malaysia after the enactment of the FRA, so as to speculate on factors that 
would be critical in corporate compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) when 
adopted for use in Malaysia in 2006. There is therefore the need to identify characteristics of companies 
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that complied with the mandatory disclosure requirements and those that did not, so that any 
educational effort can be focused on the latter group of companies. Thus, the study is an attempt to aid 
policy makers in any effort to educate companies on how to provide adequate information for investment 
and credit decision-making after the adoption of the IFRSs. Prior to the introduction of MASB in 1997, only 
two comprehensive studies were undertaken (Tan 1998; Abdul Latiff and Skeratt 1996), during which time 
compliance with the accounting standards was not mandatory in Malaysia. Since the introduction of 
mandatory MASB standards, no comprehensive studies have been conducted to examine companies’ 
compliance with the standards. The studies by Rahman (1998) and Lambert and Lambert (2003) provide 
insights on disclosure levels relating to specific IASs and they use a limited sample size. Rahman (1998) 
includes only 15 Malaysian firms whereas Lambert and Lambert (2003) increased the Malaysian sample to 
20 firms. A limited number of studies examining compliance with specific MASB standards include Wan 
Hussin et al. 2003, Ku Nor Izah 2003 and Sharir et al. 2003. They document that the compliance level is 
generally high. We undertake this study to provide a more comprehensive survey on compliance with all 
accounting standards in Malaysia as at 31 December 2004 by examining all Bursa-Malaysia listed firms. 
Secondly, while prior studies have examined the effects of several company-specific characteristics such 
as company size, company age, liquidity, profitability, industry, and auditor-type on the degree of 
corporate compliance with mandatory disclosure, none has investigated the influence of corporate 
governance parameters (board characteristics and ownership structure) on mandatory disclosure. The 
present study is, therefore, an attempt to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
The year 2004 is chosen because various institutional changes have taken place, predominantly the 
introduction of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and Revamped Listing Requirements in 2001 
that might improve further the compliance level with MASBs.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section, section two, describes the legislative 
and institutional structures that impact on corporate financial reporting practices in Malaysia and 
develops the testable hypotheses between disclosure compliance (the extent of mandatory disclosure) 
and nine factors (corporate governance and company-specific characteristics). Section describes the 
procedures used to draw the sample, gather data, measure corporate mandatory disclosure compliance 
levels, and fit the regression equation to the data. Section four presents and discusses the results of the 
statistical tests conducted. Finally, section five summarizes the study, highlights the limitations of the 
study, provides suggestions for further research and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
  
The quality of financial reporting of a company is influenced, to a large extent, by the financial reporting 
regulations of the country the company belongs to (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Financial reporting 
regulation is necessary in order to achieve quality financial reporting. There are several reasons why 
financial reporting regulation is necessary. Based on the rationales from the economic literature Ma 
(1997) for example cited two reasons. First, accounting information is a public good in which any 
interested party can have access to the information. Being a public good, besides shareholders who pay 
for the information, there will be free riders1 who also obtain the information from the financial reports. 
In determining the quantity of information to produce, managers do not take into account the value of 
the information to the free riders. Thus, information is under-produced, and there is a market failure2 
unless regulation of financial reporting is introduced (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
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Second, it is argued that management has more information about the value of a firm than do outside 
investors, or there is information asymmetry. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), companies 
whose share prices are undervalued have the incentive to signal that fact by disclosing more information. 
Overvalued firms, on the other hand, do not provide additional information and this signals the fact that 
the firms are overvalued. The shares of some of the overvalued firms then drop and as a result become 
undervalued. These companies will signal the fact by providing more disclosure, and the process 
continues until the worst performing companies do not signal. However, the signalling activities can lead 
to overproduction of information in financial reports. Part of the information relates to historical 
performance and not to future performance. Thus there is no social benefit obtained. When this happens, 
the authorities have to interfere and introduce financial reporting regulation to overcome market failure.  
 
However, based on the free-market approach of the agency theory3, it is argued that there is no need for 
accounting regulations. Under the theory, accounting information is regarded as an economic good, and 
like any other economic good, its optimal production is determined by demand and supply factors in the 
market place. Since market forces can ensure an optimal disclosure it is argued that financial reporting 
regulation is not necessary (Ma 1997). Although this is a sound theory, for some reasons its practical 
application is believed to be limited. In the presence of regulations, this free-market approach, however, 
can be argued to lead to extra disclosure to meet market forces since regulations only cover the minimum 
disclosure requirements. 
 
The social environment and stage of economic development are also believed to have an influence on the 
financial reporting system of a country (Abdul Rahman, 1998). As the sophistication of the economy 
becomes greater, more regulations are likely to be needed in a country.   
2.1 Historical Development of Financial Reporting in Malaysia 
 
The history of financial reporting in Malaysia is reasonably short. Although the securities industry has 
existed since the 1870s with the presence of British companies in the tin and rubber industries (KLSE, 
1998), the first financial reporting regulation in Malaysia can be traced back only as far as 1940 when the 
Companies Ordinance (amendments) of 1940 was established (Tan, 2000). Further Ordinances followed in 
1946 and 1956. The Ordinances played a major role in regulating financial reporting during the period 
until the Malaysian Companies Act (based on the Victorian Act 1961) was enacted in 1965. Prior to the 
establishment of the Act, there had been calls for greater regulation in financial reporting. Babiak (1966) 
for instance, drew attention to weaknesses and the absence of uniform accounting standards, areas in 
which improvements were needed.  
 
The development of accounting standards only began in the late 1970s and most of the accounting 
standards were adoption of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) (Tan 2000). A major turning 
point in the history of financial reporting in Malaysia started in the mid 1990s. Since 1995, several major 
events that resulted in significant impact upon financial reporting regulations have taken place. They were 
followed by the enforcement of the Financial Reporting Act 1997 on 6 March 1997 that saw the 
establishment of the MASB and the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF). The outbreak of the 1997/1998 
Asian financial crisis brought about significant development of financial reporting in Malaysia. Since then, 
a number of regulations have been amended and introduced. 
 
Table 1 
Present key agencies of Malaysian financial reporting 
Agency Year Role 
The Influence of Corporate Governance and Firm’s Characteristics ………Malaysian Listed Companies 
Azhar Abdul Rahman/Wan Nordin Wan Hussin 
 
157 | P a g e  
 
established 
Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) 2002 Administers Companies Act 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB) 
1997 Sets accounting standards 
Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) 1997 Oversees MASB’s performance, and 
financial and funding arrangements 
Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) 1993 Regulates capital market 
Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) 1973 Monitors securities market 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 1967 Regulates accounting profession 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 1959 A central bank, and regulates the 
financial institutions and insurance 
companies 
Malaysian Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (MICPA)4 
1958 A professional accounting body 
 
The structure of financial reporting regulation in Malaysia is composed of legislation and requirements set 
by various regulatory agencies, which consists of the government and the private agencies. Table 1 
summarizes the regulatory agencies that make up the present Malaysian financial reporting framework. 
The agencies are involved in formulating authoritative accounting regulations and/or in enforcing these 
regulations. They include the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), which monitors compliance with 
Companies Act 1965, and the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB), which issues accounting 
standards. Presently, the Companies Act, MASB standards, Listing Requirements of the Bursa Malaysia 
and the guidelines of the SC are the major sources of reference for corporate reporting in Malaysia.  
 
2.4 Hypothesis Development 
 
Prior studies suggest that corporate compliance with mandatory disclosure is influenced by certain 
company-specific characteristics (e.g. Cerf, 1961; Wallace et al. 1994; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; McNalley et al., 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke 1989, 
1991, 1992; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Meek et al., 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). The characteristics considered include size, listing status, leverage, 
profitability, dispersion of stock ownership, industry, type of auditor, and country of origin. Overall, these 
studies indicate that size and listing status are significantly associated with the level of disclosure. Findings 
regarding the relationship between level of disclosure and other corporate variables have been mixed 
(see Street and Gray [2001] for a review). 
 
In this study, the influences of some of these characteristics, namely, board independence, audit 
committee independence, the existence of qualified accountant in the audit committee, CEO duality, the 
extent of outside blockholders’ ownership, firm size, and leverage on mandatory disclosure compliance 
levels of Malaysian listed companies are investigated. In this section, several relational conjectures, based 
on economic theories, prior results, and a priori reasoning, between each corporate-specific characteristic 
and compliance with mandatory disclosure are made. 
 
Board Structure 
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The board of directors could effectively delineate the rights and the interests and responsibilities of the 
various stakeholders in the company (Ho and Wong, 2001). Two important board’s characteristics are 
board independence and the separation of the board chairman and CEO (e.g. Shamsul Nahar and Norita, 
2004; Ho and Wong, 2001, Kosnik, 1987 and 1990; Weisbach, 1988).  
 
Theory on the importance of the board of directors in protecting the various stakeholders’ interests is 
mainly derived from the agency theory (Jensen, 1993; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The theory predicts that the representations of outside independent directors on the board leads 
to greater the board incentives to fulfill their monitoring roles. Thus, this would translate to the board 
effectiveness. Evidence, however, is mixed (Weisbach, 1988; Beasley, 1996; Shamsul Nahar and Norita, 
2004; Norman, Mohd Mohid and Takiah, 2004). Thus, outside representations do not necessarily translate 
into board effective monitoring.  
 
In the Malaysian context, several studies have been carried out to examine effects of board independence 
on its monitoring effectiveness. The earliest work was by Annuar and Shamser (1994) who examine the 
wealth effects of the announcement of outside directors. Their evidence shows that the announcement 
does not have any significant impact on the share price of the relevant companies. In a subsequent study 
by Abdullah (1999), a positive influence of board independence on earnings quality is documented. 
Norman et al. (2004), examining the period after the crisis and after the implementation RLRs, find that 
board independence does not influence accrual management. Mohd Nasir and Abdullah (2004), 
investigating distressed companies after the crisis and the period before and at the early implementation 
of RLRs, do not show any significant influence of board independence on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
It is expected that board independence plays an important role in ensuring the management to comply 
with MASB approved standards in preparing the company’s accounts. This is because failures to comply 
with the standards could lead to negative publicity which adversely affect their value in the labor market. 
Further, outside directors are seen by the public as “decision expert and decision ratifications” (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). Being at center of the corporate governance, board independence is expected to be 
associated with compliance with the MASB standards. Second, the period the present study is interested 
in is financial year 2004, which is about three years after the implementation of RLRs. One of the 
requirements of RLRs is directors’ training to enable directors to enhance their capacity to discharge their 
duties. Therefore, it is expected that during the period of this study, independent directors have attended 
this course. Thus, we predict that this translates into compliance with the MASB standards. Hypothesis 
relating board independence and compliance is as follows: 
 
H1: Board independence leads to higher level of compliance with MASB standards. 
 
As discussed earlier, board’s monitoring incentives are affected by whether the roles of the board 
chairman and CEO are separated or combined. Combining these two roles leads to the present of 
dominant personality (Collier, 1993). Further non-executive chairman promotes a higher level of 
corporate openness (Miller, 1997). Thus, combining these roles could disrupt the flow of information to 
the public as argued by Ho and Wong (2001), this leads to the Chairman-CEO withholding unfavorable 
information to outsiders. Forker (1992) also finds that CEO duality negatively associated with the quality 
of share-option disclosure in the annual reports. The Cadbury Report (1992), the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 2001) and the Hampel Report 
(1998) are supporting the separation of the top roles to ensure the that appropriate check and balance 
system exists.  
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Several studies have thus far been carried out to determine the effect of the separation of the board’ 
monitoring effectiveness and the evidence is mixed. Abdullah (1999) shows that combining the roles leads 
to lower earnings quality. However, in a subsequent study, Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir (2004) do not find 
evidence relating CEO duality to accrual management. Norman et al. (2004), on the other hand, show that 
CEO duality leads to higher earnings management. This evidence is consistent with the evidence offered 
by Mohd-Nasir and Abdullah (2004), who find that CEO duality is associated with lower amount of 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
Theory of dominant personality leads to the negative association between CEO duality and compliance 
with MASB standards. However, empirical studies, both in Malaysia and in developed countries including 
Hong Kong and Singapore, show mixed evidence. Perhaps, the positive effects of separating the two roles 
are negated by the slow of decision making processes which are better handled and much quicker if the 
two roles are combined. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: CEO duality leads to low level of compliance with MASB standards. 
 
Audit Committees 
 
Audit committees are sub-committee of the board of directors whose responsibilities are to oversee the 
financial reporting processes of their firms. Collier (1993) argues that audit committees help to ensure the 
financial accounting and control system. Forker (1992) also postulates that audit committees could 
effectively improve the internal control and thus could serve as a device to improve a firm’s disclosure 
quality. His evidence, nevertheless, fails to support the contention. The evidence by McMullen (1996), on 
the other hand, supports the contention of a positive and significant link between audit committee and 
reliable financial reporting. A study in Hong Kong by Ho and Wong (2001), nonetheless, show no 
association between audit committee and the amount of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Empirical studies on the monitoring incentives of audit committees in Malaysia have generally produced 
mixed results as well. Abdullah and Al-Murisi (1997) found that audit committee independence is not 
associated with its effectiveness while having a qualified accountant is associated positively with its 
effectiveness. In a subsequent study, Abdullah and Ku Ismail (1999) fail to show the importance of audit 
committee independence nor having a qualified accountant. Abdullah (1999) also fails to show a 
significant influence of audit committee independence on the earnings quality. In a subsequent study, 
Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir (2004) do not find evidence of the influence of audit committee independence 
on the accrual management. The relation between audit committee independence and having a qualified 
accountant on audit committee on the compliance with MASB standards is predicted to be positive and 
significant. The reason is that compliance with MASB standards is mandatory and failure to comply could 
have significant adverse impact on the reputation of independent audit committee members and their 
professional accounting bodies. Thus, the related hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H3: Audit committee independence is positively associated with compliance with MASB standards. 
 
H4: Having a qualified accountant on audit committee leads to higher level of compliance with MASB 
standards. 
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The presence of outside blockholders is expected to have significant impact on the compliance with the 
MASB standards. This is because these outside blockholders could demand more information to be 
disclosed in the annual reports to ensure transparency and to reduce information asymmetry among the 
small shareholders. The evidence by Mohd-Nasir and Abdullah (2004) supports this contention where a 
positive and significant influence between outside blockholders and the amount of voluntary disclosure. 
Further, Abdullah (2004) finds that outside blockholders are negatively associated wit financial distressed 
status. It is therefore predicted the extent of ownership by outside blockholders leads to compliance with 
MASB standards. This is because the wealth of these outside blockholders is tied with the value of the 
firms. Any deviations from MASB standards lead to auditor to issue a qualified report which could 
adversely affect the market valuation of the shares of the firms. Thus, the extent of outside blockholders’ 
ownership provides a greater incentive for compliance with MASB standards. Therefore, the hypothesis is 
as follows: 
 
H5: The extent of ownership by outside blockholders leads to higher level of compliance with MASB 
standards. 
 
Control Variables 
 
A large number of studies on financial disclosure attempted to associate the extent of disclosure with 
specific attributes of a company. Several company attributes have been examined in previous disclosure 
studies to explain the variations in the extent of disclosure. These include variables that are associated, 
for example, with structure (size and capital structure), performance (profitability and growth), corporate 
governance, and culture of a company. The most frequently examined attributes have been corporate size  
and capital structure(Ahmed and Courtis 1999).   
 
Firm Size  
In numerous disclosure studies, size has persistently been found to have a positive association with the 
extent of annual report disclosure (Cerf 1961, Buzby 1975, McNally et al. 1982, Naser 1998). Cerf (1961) 
provided a comprehensive discussion as to why size is hypothesised to be positively associated with the 
extent of disclosure. He argued that larger firms are more conscious of the needs of investors. They are 
likely to be in the public eye and more subject to shareholders’ and analysts’ pressures. Moreover, 
accumulation and dissemination of information is costly and smaller firms might not find it worthwhile. 
Larger firms which are argued to have better internal reporting would have the information ready for 
management to be adequately informed. It is also argued that a high level of disclosure would place 
smaller firms in a competitively disadvantageous position. 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, this study hypothesises that the size of a firm is positively associated 
with the extent of disclosure. This study measures size by the total assets of a company, a measure used 
in a large number of studies (e.g. Singhvi 1968, Buzby 1975, McNally et al. 1982, Tan et al. 1990, Wallace 
et al. 1994, Hossain et al. 1995, and Schadewitz and Blevins 1998). The hypothesis to be tested is: 
 
H6:  There is a positive association between the level of compliance and size of a company. 
 
Capital Structure  
From the perspective of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that higher bonding costs 
would be incurred by firms that are highly leveraged. As financial disclosure is used for monitoring 
purposes, it is expected that firms that are highly leveraged would disclose more information in the 
quarterly reports. Thus, the relationship between leverage and the extent of disclosure is expected to be 
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positive. Nevertheless, previous evidence shows that the results were inconclusive. Some studies showed 
a significant relationship (e.g. Courtis, 1979 and Hossain et al., 1995 in annual report studies; and 
Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998 in interim report studies), while others found no relationship. (e.g. Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; and Wallace et al., 1994 in annual report studies). 
 
Based on the argument provided by agency theory, this thesis hypothesizes that highly leveraged firms 
disclose more information in the annual reports compared to the lowly leveraged firms. Various measures 
of leverage have been adopted in the literature, depending on the objective of the analysis (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995). Leverage could be measured in terms of book value or market value. This study measures 
leverage in terms of the ratio of debt to total assets, as employed by Courtis (1979) and Chow and Wong-
Boren (1987). Because some companies were insolvent and had a negative amount of equity5, measuring 
leverage as debt to equity ratio might be misleading. From the foregoing discussion, the following 
hypothesis is to be tested: 
 
H7:  There is a positive association between the level of compliance and leverage of a company. 
 
 
3.0  RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Data Collection  
According to the business magazine, Investors Digest which was published by the KLSE in 2004, as at 31 
December 2004, there were 906 companies listed on the main and second boards of Bursa Malaysia. The 
year 2004 was chosen because this study is an ongoing research project that looks into different regimes 
of disclosure requirements. The first period (from 1997 to 2004) was known as the “MASB standards-
regime”, the second  period (from 2005 to 2011) was known as the “MASB FRS-regime”, and the third 
period (from 2012 onwards) was known as the “MASB IFRS convergence-regime”. This study focuses on 
the first period by investigating the last year (2004, seven years after the introduction of MASB standards 
in 1997) before the introduction of FRSs in 20056. These companies were classified into thirteen major 
sectors. Out of this, the total number of listed companies in the main board was 557. The trust, close-end 
funds, banking, finance and insurance sector were excluded from the study as these companies have to 
follow specific disclosure requirements and therefore do not have the same comparable characteristics, 
such as sales, as non-financial companies (Wallace and Naser, 1995). Following the exclusion of the 
banking, financial and insurance companies (51), the remaining number of companies that were eligible 
for the analyses was 461. After the screening process, a further 59 companies (in various sectors) were 
also excluded from the investigation as some of these companies were classified as ‘failing’ companies 
under PN4. In addition, there were several merger activities between some companies, whilst, a number 
of companies were newly established and were awaiting a full stock exchange listing. Consequently, the 
number of the selected population was further reduced to 402. From this population of 402 companies, a 
systematic random sampling was conducted by taking the second consecutive (even) number of 
companies from the list, giving a total of 203 companies. In order to minimize cost and time, only those 
companies that provided their annual reports in hard-copy form were analysed. A letter was sent to each 
of these companies requesting a copy of their audited annual report for the year 2004. One hundred and 
seventy companies responded, giving a response rate of 84%. The data on each company-specific 
characteristic were obtained or computed from the annual reports of the companies in the sample. 
 
3.2 Research instrument  
This study employs all the relevant MASB standards as at 31 Dec. 2004, after excluding standards that are 
not applicable to all industries. The standards that are excluded in this study are interim reporting (MASB 
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26), insurance (MASB 17 and 18), research and development costs (MASB 4), the effect of changes in 
exchange rates (MASB 6), construction contracts (MASB 7), financial reporting of interests in joint 
ventures (MASB 16), financial instruments (MASB 24), accounting for government grants and disclosure of 
government assistance (MASB 31), property development activities (MASB 32), and presentation of 
financial statements of Islamic financial institutions (MASB i-1), resulting in 22 standards. A disclosure 
checklist was developed for each standard to examine companies’ disclosure practices. 
 
3.3 Measuring Compliance 
 
3.3.1 Level of Compliance 
 
To determine the extent of compliance, this study assumes that the level of compliance is associated with 
the level of disclosure in the annual reports. A dichotomous procedure as adopted by Cerf (1961) will be 
adopted. Similar procedure was subsequently used by other researchers (e.g. Naser et al. 2002; Haniffa 
and Cooke 2002; Ku Ismail and Abdullah, 1998; A. Rahman 1998). It is a simple approach by which an item 
scores ‘1’ if it is disclosed, and ‘0’ if it is not disclosed. The total disclosure (TD) score for a company is 
computed as follows: 
 
 
              m 
  TD  =  Σ d i 
              i=1 
  where d = 1 if the item d i is disclosed, 
             d = 0 if the item d i is not disclosed, and 
                                 m ≤ n ( discussed below) 
 
In deciding whether an item was of relevance to a company, several procedures used in prior literature 
were applied. First, following Cooke (1989), each annual report was thoroughly read to ascertain whether 
an undisclosed information item was, in fact, irrelevant to a company. Second, as in Owusu-Ansah (1998, 
2000), the comparative figures for each information item disclosed in one year's annual report; say 2002, 
was crosschecked against the preceding (2001), and succeeding (2003) annual reports. Third, by deductive 
reasoning, relevance of some information items to every company was easily established. For example, 
when a company has fixed assets, its depreciation policy is expected to be disclosed. 
 
As in prior studies, the content validity of the disclosure checklist was conducted by comparing it with the 
guidelines issued by a Malaysian Big-4 audit firm. Thus, using this auditor's internal checklists or guidelines 
for statutory audit as a referent, each of the disclosure items devised for this study was revised. The 
disclosure checklist was applied to the financial reports of each company, and the relevant mandated 
information items disclosed therein numerically scored. In addition, a Pearson product-moment 
correlation analysis was employed, as in prior studies, to test the reliability of the checklist after the 
annual reports have been scored to assess the subjectivity inherent in the scoring process. The present 
investigator scored the annual reports in the first instance, and then, another two persons independent of 
the study were requested to score a randomly selected sample of 10 annual reports for the same year. 
The reliability test was conducted on the scores obtained by these independent persons and those of the 
investigator. The inter-scorer coefficients are significant at the conventional levels, suggesting a minimal 
subjectivity in scoring each annual report for the presence of the mandated information items. 
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Some of the earlier studies assigned weights to the disclosure items according to their importance to the 
users of financial reports (e.g. Buzby, 1974; Wallace, 1988; Chew and Lee, 1990). However, the disclosure 
items used in this study were not weighted because it was assumed that each item of disclosure was 
equally important. This assumption is expected to be valid since this study deals with only mandatory 
disclosure, where all items that are required by the standards are regarded as of equally high importance. 
In contrast, it would have been better to have the items weighted if they had been voluntary in nature. 
An index was subsequently developed to measure the relative level of disclosure by a company. The index 
is a ratio of the actual scores obtained by a company to the maximum score possible. Since companies are 
not penalized for not disclosing irrelevant items, the maximum score (M) a company could earn varies: 
 
                                    n 
  M =  Σ d i       (1) 
           i=1 
   
where d = expected item of disclosure, and 
                                    n = the number of items which the company  
                                           is expected to disclose. 
 
The total disclosure index (TDI) for each company then becomes TD/M. The index would thus lie between 
0 and 1. A score of 1 indicates that a company disclosed all the relevant items as required by the 
standards and a score of 0 means that a company did not disclose any of the relevant items. 
 
3.4 Analysis 
Descriptive analysis was conducted for each standard in order to determine the pattern of accounting and 
disclosure practices. Next, multiple regression analysis was employed to test the determinants of the 
disclosure comprehensiveness. 
The estimated multiple regression model takes the following form: 
TDI = α + β1BDIND + β2CEODL + β3ACIND + β4ACCT + β5 OUTBLK  + β6 SIZE + β7 LEV   
          +  ε.       (2) 
        
TDI     : Total Disclosure Index;   
BDIND  : %age of independent directors on the board; 
CEODL : a dummy variable, “1” if the roles of the board chairman and CEO are combined, “0” otherwise; 
ACIND  : a dummy variable, “1” if all members are independent directors, “0” otherwise; 
ACCT   : a dummy variable, “1” if at least one audit member is a qualified accountant; “0” otherwise; 
OUTBLK : cumulative %age of shares owned by outside blockholders with shareholdings 2% and 
above; 
SIZE : natural log of book value of total assets;  
LEV : total debts divided by total assets; 
ε   : disturbance term. 
 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Extent of Compliance 
4.1.1. Disclosure Level of the sampled companies 
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Table 2 presents a distribution of the sampled companies according to the level of their compliance with 
the MASB disclosure requirements. Distribution was computed for every sector and for the total sampled 
companies. In line with the framework of analysis used by Ali et. al (2004) and Samaha and Stapleton 
(2008) a distinction is made between four levels of company compliance with MASB requirements. The 
categories are: high compliance, if the disclosure index is 80% or more, intermediate compliance between 
60% and 79%, low compliance between 40% and 59%, and below 40% which reflects a substantial gap 
between company disclosure practices and the MASB requirements. 
 
Given the results presented in Table 2, and the above compliance level framework, the first note is that all 
sampled companies in all industry sectors were found to have at least 60% compliance level. This result 
suggests that Malaysian companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Stock Exchange) complied 
with the majority of MASB disclosure requirements, with the lowest disclosure index 66% for the 
companies in the trading and service sector. 
 
Table 2 also shows that about 80% of the sampled companies have a disclosure level between 70% and 
90%. This result indicates that most of the sampled companies meet the high compliance level of the 
compliance framework used by Ali et. al, and the majority of these companies achieved a compliance level 
more than 80%. It is also noticed that only 30 companies (18% of the sampled companies) have a high 
compliance level (more than 90%), with the majority of them are from the industrial products (8), 
properties (7), and trading and service (6) sectors. No company obtained an overall compliance rate of 
100% but one company achieved the highest level of disclosure score of 99.4%. Finally, data revealed that 
only 1% of the sampled companies achieved a disclosure compliance level less than 70%. Overall, the 
average compliance rate was reasonably high at 85%. These results indicate that most Malaysian 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia comply with the disclosure requirements as required by the MASB 
standards. This reinforces the usefulness of evaluation of the factors influencing companies' compliance 
with MASB-required disclosures, especially those companies with below than average disclosure level. 
 
4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 (Panel A and B) reports descriptive statistics for all the variables in Equation 2. The results of a 
Shapiro-Wilk's test of normality, also presented in Table 3, indicate that with the exception of SIZE and 
Total Disclosure Index (TDI), all the continuous variables are not symmetrically distributed. So the data on 
each variable in Equation 2 were standardized. According to Snee (1973), standardizing variables also 
offers the following benefits: (i) it converts data to a common scale, (ii) it improves precision of regression 
estimates, and (iii) it reduces collinearity problems among independent variables. 
 
4.3 Bivariate Analysis 
Table 4 presents Pearson product-moment pairwise correlation coefficients between the standardized 
independent variables. The results in Table 4 provide no indication that an unacceptable level of 
multicollinearity is present in the data. Gujarati (1995, p. 335) suggests that harmful levels of 
multicollinearity are present when bivariate correlations reach 0.80. In this study, no correlation 
coefficient between the independent variables reached this level. 
 
4.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The parameters of Equation 2 are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares technique, the results of which 
are reported in Table 5. The hypothesis that audit committee independence is positively associated with 
compliance with MASB standards is not supported by the data. Even the related hypothesis that having a 
qualified accountant on audit committee leads to higher level of compliance with MASB standards also is 
not supported. However, the relationships are in the hypothesized direction. 
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Table 2: Distribution of sampled companies according to the level of their compliance with the MASB standards 
Disclosure 
level range 
(%) PROP IP CP TECH PLANT TS CONST INFR HOTEL MINING 
Total 
sample No. 
(%) 
                      
Over 90% 7 8 4 2 1 6 --- 1 1 --- 30(18%) 
80% - 90% 20 27 16 2 8 23 11 2 1 1 111 (65%) 
70% - 79% 1 8 4 1 2 9 2 --- --- --- 27 (16%) 
60% - 69% --- 1 --- --- --- 1 --- --- --- --- 2 (1%) 
50% - 59% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Less than 
50%  
--- 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
--- --- --- 
Total 
28 
44 24 5 11 39 13 3 
2 
 
1 
170 (100%) 
Max. 
disclosure 
level  
0.981013 
0.994286 0.977401 0.938547 0.965116 0.989474 0.896341 0.966667 0.992366 0.843284 0.994286 
Min. 
disclosure 
level  
0.769634 
0.695279 0.721739 0.707865 0.752632 0.664865 0.763285 0.805755 0.825243 0.84328 0.664865 
Overall 
disclosure 
level  
0.865776 
0.927501 0.888317 0.84988 0.925964 0.874411 0.775945 0.863108 0.908805 0.843284 
0.851626 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
 Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Median 
TDI 170 .66 .99 .8511 .06085 0.8491 
BDIND 170 .20 .80 .4126 .11126 0.38 
OUTBLK 170 .03 .90 .5489 .19964 0.59 
LEV 170 .00 .92 .1556 .14920 0.12 
SIZE 170 15.36 24.35 20.0779 1.31107 20.04 
Panel B: Dichotomous (Dummy) Variables 
Variable N n=0 n=1 Mean Std. Deviation Median 
CEODL 170 120 50 .29 .455 0 
ACIND 170 158 12 .07 .258 0 
ACCT 170 11 159 .93 .247 1 
Panel C: Tests of Normality 
 Continuous Variable Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. 
BDIND .911 169 .000 
OUTBLK .950 169 .000 
LEV .860 169 .000 
TDI .988 169 .145 
SIZE .982 169 .030 
 
Table 4: Pearson Product-moment Correlation Matrix of Standardised Variables (n = 170) 
 BDIND CEODL ACIND ACCT OUTBLK LEV SIZE 
BDIND 1       
CEODL .011 1      
ACIND .137 -.075 1     
ACCT -.050 -.096 -.114 1    
OUTBLK -.021 -.031 -.090 .045 1   
LEV .076 .096 -.042 .105 -.006 1  
SIZE -.075 .036 -.154(*) .011 .135 .256(**) 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The explanation for the lack of highly significant relationship between independence of a corporate audit 
committee and the extent of compliance may be as noted by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993, p. 27), 
establishing an audit committee is one thing: establishing an effective audit committee is quite another. 
Indeed, prior research has shown that key audit committee characteristics (such as independence from 
management, expertise of members in the areas of accounting and financial reporting, and frequency of 
meeting) rather than the mere existence of an audit committee critically impact the audit committee's 
ability to effectively execute its objectives and responsibilities (Abbott and Parker 2000, 2001; Beasley et 
al. 2000; Raghunandan et al. 2001; Carcello and Neal, 2003). 
 
Firm size (S1ZE) variable shows a negative relationship with TDI, and also is not significant7. The SIZE 
variable was expected to have a positive sign, given the economies of scale in the production and 
dissemination of information, which postulates a direct relationship between company size and the 
extent of compliance. The lack of statistical significance of the SIZE variable is due to high compliance of 
Malaysian companies with MASB disclosure requirements irrespective of whether they are small or big 
The Influence of Corporate Governance and Firm’s Characteristics ………Malaysian Listed Companies 
Azhar Abdul Rahman/Wan Nordin Wan Hussin 
 
167 | P a g e  
 
companies in terms of total assets. Since the sample of this study consists solely of publicly held 
companies; hence, size effect will be more difficult to detect by any statistical test. 
 
The hypothesis that the extent of ownership by outside blockholders (OUTBLK) leads to higher level of 
compliance with MASB standards is also not supported by the data. In fact, it shows a negative 
relationship. This evidence contradicts that of Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004) who find a positive and 
significant influence between outside blockholders and the amount of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 5: Estimates of Regression Analysis 
 Variable 
Predicted 
signs Coefficients t-values Sig. 
(Constant) ? .884  8.727 .000 
BDIND + .051 .642 .522 
CEODL - -.039 -.442 .659 
ACIND + -.099 -1.199 .233 
ACCT + .031 .376 .707 
SIZE + -.057 -.567 .572 
LEV + .219 2.603 .010 
OUTBLK + -.078 -.628 .531 
Summary of model: 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square F Sig. 
.308(a) .095 .017 1.218 .272(a) 
The board independence (BDIND) variable has a positive relationship with TDI even though it is not 
significant. This shows that the requirements for directors to undergo training to enable them to enhance 
their capacity to discharge their duties has been effective, in the sense that it has been translated into a 
high compliance with the MASB standards. The hypothesis that CEO duality (CEODL) leads to low level of 
compliance with MASB standards is not supported but it conforms with the hypothesized direction 
(negatively related) to TDI. This finding is consistent with the evidence offered by Norita and Shamsul 
Nahar (2004), who find that CEO duality is associated with lower amount of voluntary disclosure; as well 
as by Norman et al. (2004) who find that CEO duality leads to higher earnings management.  
 
The empirical data also does not support the hypothesis that the extent of compliance by companies is 
positively associated with audit committee independence (ACIND). In addition, the result shows a 
negative relationship. This finding supports prior studies by Shamsul Nahar and Norizah (1999), Shamsul 
Nahar (1999), and Shamsul Nahar and Norita (2004). The related hypothesis that having a qualified 
accountant (ACCT) on audit committee leads to higher level of compliance with MASB standards is also 
not supported, but it was in the hypothesized direction. This finding corroborates the conclusions in prior 
studies by Norman et al. (2004) and Shamsul Nahar and Norizah (1999). 
 
The only variable that shows a significant positive relationship with TDI is leverage (LEV). This finding 
support the findings in prior studies by Courtis (1979) and Hossain and Adams (1995) in annual report 
studies; and Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) in interim report studies. The significant positive relationship 
indicates that highly leveraged firms show a higher level of compliance with MASB standards compared to 
lowly leveraged firms. 
In summary, the empirical analysis suggests that leverage is the most a critical explanatory factor of the 
extent by which Malaysia-listed companies complied with MASB accounting standards. The other 
variables consisting of board independence, audit committee independence, the existence of qualified 
accountant in the audit committee, CEO duality, management ownership, the extent of outside 
blockholders’ ownership, ownership structure, firm size, scope of business, industry type, profitability and 
type of external auditor do not show any significant relationship with degree of compliance.  
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5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
The purpose of this study was to empirically investigate the relationships between nine factors (corporate 
governance and company-specific characteristics) and the extent of compliance with MASB accounting 
standards by companies listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia) for the financial year 
ending 2004. The empirical results indicate that leverage is the only factor that could explain the degree 
of corporate compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in Malaysia. All the other twelve 
variables show insignificant relationship. The results of this study provide empirical evidence that 
Malaysian companies irrespective of their different characteristics tend to provide a high compliance with 
the disclosure requirements imposed by the relevant regulatory bodies.  
 
Overall, the results provide strong evidence that highly leveraged companies tend to provide greater 
compliance with MASB accounting standards compared to lowly leveraged companies. Therefore, policy 
makers in Malaysia may focus more on lowly leveraged companies in any educational effort to prepare 
these companies in the country about their external reporting responsibilities once the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) are fully adopted in the country in 2012. 
 
The results of this study are subject to several limitations. First, while extensive efforts were made to 
develop an accurate proxy for the extent of compliance with accounting standards, the assumption that 
each disclosure item may represent the degree of compliance, as evidenced by the dichotomous scoring 
of the items, is subject to some degree of subjectivity. The disclosure of the same items by companies but 
located in different sections of their annual reports makes the comparison much more difficult. In 
addition, the number of non-applicable items also varies between different companies in different 
industries, which in turn affect the scoring of disclosure items. Second, the results may not be 
generalizable to all companies listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia), as the empirical 
analysis is limited to only those Malaysian companies listed on the first board. Third, given the 
exceedingly complex nature of corporate disclosure, there are inherent limits in the ability of empirical 
research to capture all the factors that influence disclosure decisions made by managements of 
companies. Finally, the regression analysis does not resolve issues of causality. The observed relationships 
between the company-specific characteristics and the extent of compliance do not necessarily prove 
causation. Kerlinger (1973. p. 393) cautioned, "...the study of cause and causation is an endless maze. One 
of the difficulties is that the word "cause" has surplus meaning and metaphysical overtones. Perhaps 
more important, it is not really needed." Consequently, the coefficients of the significant company-
specific characteristics of Equation 2 should not be viewed as elasticities that predict how much the 
extent of compliance will change following a change in any of those characteristics. Rather, the estimated 
coefficients evaluate the strength of the partial correlation between the characteristics and the degree of 
compliance. Although the observed relationships reported in this study do not establish causality, 
Graziano and Raulin (1997) argue that they serve two functions. First, any consistent relationships found 
in the data can be used to predict future events, which is one of the stated motivations for this study. 
Second, it provides data that are either consistent or inconsistent with some currently held scientific 
theory. 
 
Several new directions for future research are suggested by the research design of this study. First, the 
relatively low adjusted R-squared in some cases suggest that there are several missing variables not 
factored into the estimation. Thus, in addition to those characteristics investigated in this study, the 
relationships between multiple-listing status, internationalization of operations and affiliation with 
multinational corporations, other important financial ratios, and company age should be investigated in 
future studies. Second, this study could be replicated using cross-national data. For example, data from 
Malaysia could be compared with those from other ASEAN or Asian countries, as these countries have 
similar accounting infrastructure and have had changes in the financial reporting regulatory regimes. 
Finally, a longitudinal approach could be used to investigate the degree of compliance over a long period 
or for a certain period before and after the effective implementation year to examine the trend or 
behavior of disclosure as well as specific types of corporate disclosure in Malaysia, such as segmental 
reporting. 
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Notes: 
1 A free rider is a person who does not purchase the public good since he is assured of the supply once it is 
made available to the public. 
2 According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), market failure exists when accounting information produced 
in the absence of regulation is nonoptimal in a Pareto sense, or because the market for financial 
information results in resource allocation which is inequitable, that is, “unfair” to some groups or 
individuals. 
3 Agency theory assumes a relationship between the principal (owner) and agent (manager) in which the 
agent manages the wealth of the principal. In such a relationship, information from the agent is desired by 
the principal in order to monitor the agent’s behaviour as well as to motivate the agent to act in the 
principal’s interest. 
4 Formerly known as the MACPA. 
5 In Malaysia, a KLSE listed company whose equity is negative is classified as a Practice Note 4 (PN4) 
company.  
6 The second phase of this study will investigate the level of information disclosed by Malaysian public 
listed companies in their annual reports for the year ended 2011 (seven years from the introduction of 
FRS standards in 2005).  
7When the original value of total assets was tested (before transformation), the coefficient was positive. 
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